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OH, MI: A Note on Empirical 
Examinations of Judicial 
Elections
Michael J. Nelson1, Rachel Paine Caufield2, 
and Andrew D. Martin1
Abstract
Studies of state judicial selection systems require accurate classification of electoral 
systems. While agreement exists for most states, Ohio and Michigan are difficult 
to classify. In this paper, we discuss the different practices and explain how, in the 
absence of candidates’ party affiliation on the ballot, elections in these states may 
justifiably be classified as partisan. Replicating the results of an important study on 
participation in judicial elections, we show how the treatment of these states may 
result in differing substantive conclusions. We conclude by urging scholars to provide 
evidence that their results are robust to alternative classifications.
Keywords
judicial elections, judicial politics, judicial selection, electoral systems, election rules, 
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OH, MI: On Empirical Examinations of Judicial Elections
The American states use a variety of methods to select and retain their judges, and, 
over the past half-century, political scientists have leveraged that variation to unravel 
the consequences of differing judicial selection mechanisms. For example, studies 
have indicated that judges elected in nonpartisan elections tend to follow public opin-
ion better in abortion cases than those chosen in partisan elections (Caldarone, Canes-
Wrone, and Clark 2009), that partisan elections encourage higher rates of voter turnout 
than nonpartisan elections (Hall and Bonneau 2008), and that Kansas judges retained 
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through partisan elections tend to sentence more severely than those retained using 
retention elections (Gordon and Huber 2007).
Comparisons such as these rely on scholars’ ability to classify the selection and 
retention methods used within a jurisdiction accurately. While most states are easy to 
categorize, state supreme court races in Michigan and Ohio are difficult to classify 
because of the formal institutions that govern the candidate selection process in these 
two states. As a result, scholars have treated these states’ judicial elections different 
ways. In this paper, we discuss the “confusion and disagreement” regarding the best 
way to classify judicial elections in these states and probe the assumptions that are 
inherent in either coding decision (Hurwitz 2010, 701).
To illustrate the consequences of this coding decision, we replicate the results of 
Hall and Bonneau’s (2008) study of the differences in citizen participation in judicial 
elections. Our intent is not to criticize the Hall and Bonneau study; rather, we utilize 
their data, as their study is an ideal one to illustrate the effects of this coding choice 
because it includes both the candidate selection and general election stages of the elec-
toral process. The empirical results show that varying treatments of these two states 
may result in different substantive conclusions.
To this end, the confusion in academic articles and reference works, coupled with 
the potential of these two states to drive substantive conclusions, lead us to make two 
recommendations: scholarship examining these systems should (a) clearly delineate 
the theory behind one’s coding decisions and (b) test and report the results of empirical 
analyses using alternative coding when multiple coding decisions could be theoreti-
cally justified.
Background
While the formal selection institutions used in both the candidate selection and general 
election stages of the electoral process are the same in most states, Ohio and Michigan 
combine elements of partisan and nonpartisan systems in the processes they use to 
select and retain their state supreme court justices. In Ohio, judicial candidates advance 
to the general election ballot after they have received the support of voters in a partisan 
primary election; however, partisan labels do not appear on the general election ballot 
(Baum 1987b; Rock and Baum 2010).1
Similarly, in Michigan, state supreme court candidates must be nominated at a 
party convention in order to secure a spot on the general election ballot; again, in the 
general election, partisan labels are absent (Hurwitz 2010; Wheat and Hurwitz 2013). 
Given these unique institutional arrangements, Cheek and Champagne (2003, 1360–
61) argue that Michigan and Ohio “can be considered partisan election states because 
party activity is so pervasive.”
In recent years, a number of scholars have noted the prominent role of political par-
ties in judicial elections in these two states. Tarr (2003, 1447) notes that elections in 
both states are only “nominally nonpartisan,” while Schotland (2007, 1085) writes 
that, in both states, “the parties are active” and the “campaigns are clearly partisan.” 
Thomas R. Phillips (2009, 85), the former Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 
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argues that “parties dominate the nominations of and campaigns for” the judicial can-
didates in Michigan and Ohio.
This is not a new phenomenon. Studies of judicial elections in both states have long 
noted the influence of partisan politics in the early stages of the electoral process. 
Indeed, Ulmer (1962, 354), discussing a Detroit News article reporting that four judi-
cial candidates indicated that they would “shun court tradition and campaign as parti-
san Democrats,” writes that
each candidate is identified by party affiliation in almost every newspaper covering judicial 
elections. A considerable amount of publicity is also given the actions of the candidate and 
the party during the nominating period. From this alone, no one in the state need have any 
doubt as to who is what.
Other historical accounts note the partisan nature of these contests. Dubois (1979) 
writes that the partisanship of Michigan judicial elections “is renowned” while noting 
that party workers in Ohio distributed lists of party candidates, including judicial can-
didates, to voters heading into their polling place to vote. Nagel (1961, 850) attributes 
the lack of a statistically significant difference between judges elected in partisan and 
nonpartisan elections on “the near-meaninglessness of non-partisan ballots where 
there are organized and competing political parties running the elections behind the 
scenes.” Importantly, while Flango and Ducat (1979, 28) classify the two states as 
nonpartisan, they note that the states “may be prime candidates for reclassification in 
later studies.”
Studies of judicial elections and state judicial decision-making have been split on 
the correct way to classify these two states. In a variety of studies, Shepherd (2009a; 
2009b; 2010) classifies both electoral systems as nonpartisan, and Langer’s (2002) 
study of judicial review in state supreme courts categorizes elections in both Michigan 
and Ohio as nonpartisan contests. Bonneau and Hall, in their book-length examination 
of judicial elections (2009), as well as numerous articles (Bonneau 2004; 2005a; 
2005b; 2007a; 2007b; Bonneau and Hall 2003; Hall and Bonneau 2006; 2008; 2013; 
Hall 2001; 2007), classify both states as nonpartisan election states.
On the other hand, Brace and Hall (1993; Hall and Brace 1992; 1999), in their stud-
ies of state judicial decision-making in death penalty cases, classify Ohio as a partisan 
election state. Likewise, Peters (2009), in his examination of the effects of state canons 
of judicial conduct, classifies both states as partisan election states. Streb, Frederick, 
and LaFrance (2007) classify intermediate appellate court elections in these states as 
partisan contests, and Streb (2007) classifies Ohio Court of Common Pleas contests as 
partisan elections in his study of party involvement in judicial campaigns.2
Some scholars consider the two states as a new category entirely. In some of the 
first empirical studies of judicial elections, Dubois (1979) classifies these electoral 
systems as “mixed” and treats them separately throughout his analysis. In more recent 
work, Kritzer (2007; 2011) also follows this convention. Still, Kritzer (2011, 244) 
notes that elections in mixed states “group more appropriately with partisan elections 
given the active and explicit role of parties in the process.”
 at WASHINGTON UNIV SCHL OF MED on January 10, 2014spa.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
498 State Politics & Policy Quarterly 13(4)
The confusion in the scholarly literature today is, in large part, a result of disagree-
ment among reference works about the proper classification of these electoral systems. 
While many scholars cite three authorities (the American Judicature Society, the 
National Council of State Government’s The Book of the States, or the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics’s State Court Organization) as the source of their classification sys-
tem, each of these publications has altered their classification of these two states over 
time. Indeed, over the past decade, the American Judicature Society has changed its 
classification of both of these states from nonpartisan elections to partisan elections 
(American Judicature Society 2003; American Judicature Society 2013). Likewise, 
since 1990, The Book of the States has classified both states as nonpartisan and parti-
san elections, and State Court Organization has changed its classification of Ohio 
from a nonpartisan election system to a partisan election system.3
Why Might We Classify Them As Nonpartisan Election States?
Much prominent research on judicial selection—relying on the reference works men-
tioned above—has prioritized the text of the ballot over the institutional and systemic 
factors that structure the electoral process. Typically, if the candidate’s party identifi-
cation appears next to their name on the ballot in a general election, the election is 
classified as partisan; if it does not, the election is nonpartisan. This is a simplistic and 
clear criterion, based on the most obvious and visible change states made to their bal-
lots in response to fears that judicial elections were too partisan (Driscoll and Nelson 
2013a; Hanssen 2004; Shugerman 2012). While simple, this approach relies on two 
assumptions. First, this approach assumes that the behavior being studied is influenced 
primarily by the text of the ballot rather than by external information that voters bring 
with them to the polling place. Second, this approach assumes that the partisan char-
acter of an electoral contest is based on the presence of a party label on the ballot in the 
general election rather than the party’s role in the candidate selection process.
First, this coding approach assumes that voters are primarily influenced by cues 
they receive from the ballot rather than by information that they bring with them into 
the polling place. Compared with other types of elections, many judicial elections 
(particularly those to fill seats on lower courts) are unquestionably low-information 
contests, and it is difficult for voters to learn about the candidates and to use that infor-
mation to affect their vote. To this end, research on the effectiveness of ballot text 
indicates that information printed on the ballot assists uninformed voters by providing 
them with informational shortcuts that they can use as voting cues (Lupia 1994). In the 
absence of these voting cues, the cost of voting increases, and voters may either 
become more likely to abstain or to cast uninformed votes (Bonneau and Hall 2009).
Second, by categorizing elections based on the presence of a party label on the bal-
lot rather than on the presence of formal partisan involvement in earlier stages of the 
electoral process, scholars make a second assumption: the partisan character of an 
election comes from the presence of a party label on the general election ballot rather 
than the role that the political party plays in selecting the candidates who will appear 
on that ballot.4 In many cases where party labels are not on the general election ballot, 
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the party’s role is diminished. As Wright (2008, 14) writes, “when candidates do not 
run as members of the party, there is little or no party responsibility or discipline, thus 
undermining the incentives for the parties to be involved.” If parties have no incentive 
to be involved in the election because of the lack of a party label on the ballot, then this 
assumption may be justified.
Why Might We Classify Them As Partisan?
Nominally, judicial elections in these two states may be “nonpartisan” insofar as party 
identification does not appear on the ballot in the general election. Yet, not all electoral 
classifications are based on the presence of a party label on the ballot. Lascher (1991, 
656), for example, defines nonpartisan elections as “contests in which (a) political par-
ties do not select candidates and (b) contestants’ names appear on ballots without their 
party identification.” Indeed, while criterion (b) of Lascher’s definition is met in both 
Ohio and Michigan, criterion (a) is not met in either case. By Lascher’s definition, 
electoral contests in these two states are partisan.
Still, this coding scheme also requires assumptions on the part of the researcher; 
these assumptions are mirror images of the two assumptions discussed in the previous 
section. First, this coding system requires scholars to assume that voters bring outside 
information with them into the voting booth. Second, it requires the assumption that 
the candidate selection stage of the electoral process is as important as the text of the 
general election ballot when determining the partisan character of the election.
The first assumption required by the decision to treat elections in these two states 
as partisan elections is that voters bring outside information with them into the ballot 
box. While many judicial elections can be low information contests, Bonneau and 
Hall (2009; Hall and Bonneau 2006) have presented compelling evidence that voters 
make informed decisions in state supreme court elections by utilizing information 
that is not on the ballot—namely, candidates’ prior judicial experience—to make 
their decisions at the polls. To this end, Bonneau and Hall (2009, 133-34) write that 
“[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, voters appear to be quite capable of making 
smart political choices” and that the claim “that voters cannot evaluate candidates” is 
“not accurate” (103).
In addition, Baum’s surveys of Ohio voters are illustrative. Studying voter deci-
sion-making in the 1984 elections, Baum (1987a, 369) finds that “party was an impor-
tant basis for [voters’] decisions even though the ballot did not disclose the candidates’ 
party affiliations.” Moreover, though their survey experiment indicates that providing 
voters with partisan information lowers their probability of abstention and increases 
their ability to cast a party-line vote, Klein and Baum’s (2001) empirical analysis indi-
cates that, holding constant the amount of partisan information given to voters, party 
identification plays an important role in voter decision-making. Most recently, Rock 
and Baum (2010), analyzing Ohio elections between 1986 and 2006, find that, given a 
highly visible campaign, almost 70% of individuals casting votes will vote for the 
candidate of their own party.5 In addition, they find that, as the amount of information 
available to voters during the campaign (as measured by the amount of spending in the 
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campaign or the amount of media coverage) increases, partisan voting increases as 
well. Given the prominent role that political parties play in funding Ohio judicial can-
didates, Rock and Baum’s finding implies that even though party affiliation is absent 
from the ballot, the large amounts of money provided by political parties to judicial 
candidates facilitate the ability of voters to select a candidate from their political party 
on election day.
This assumption also receives evidence of validity in an entirely different electoral 
circumstance. Driscoll and Nelson (2013b) show that, in the initial Bolivian national 
judicial elections, where candidates were pre-screened by the national legislature and 
their party affiliations were published in newspaper accounts but candidates were pro-
hibited from campaigning and party labels were absent from the ballot, majority party 
candidates did better in municipalities that historically favored the majority party’s 
candidates.
Second, this coding system requires the assumption that the candidate selection 
process plays an integral role in determining the partisanship of an electoral contest. 
Evidence for this assumption comes from an emerging view of political parties cham-
pioned by Masket (2009) and Bawn et al. (2012). These scholars argue that political 
parties in the United States “are best understood as coalitions of interest groups and 
activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals” (Bawn et al. 
2012, 571). By this view, political parties are particularly active at the nomination 
stage of the electoral process; by selecting a nominee that comports well with the 
party’s views, the political party is empowered. Drawing on a natural experiment in 
California’s history, Masket (2007; 2009) shows that, when the power of these infor-
mal party organizations was weakened, California legislators became more represen-
tative of their district’s median voter; when these party organizations were able to 
again influence the nomination process, legislators became more loyal to their party. 
In Masket’s (2009, 86) words, “control of the nomination is the essence of party 
discipline.”
Does It Matter?
There is reason to believe that the classification of Michigan and Ohio could affect 
empirical conclusions. While they are only a pair of the 39 states that use some form 
of judicial elections to select or retain their jurists (American Judicature Society 2013), 
summary statistics indicate that the judicial contests in these two states are unusual in 
a number of important ways. Bonneau (2007c), for example, discusses the large 
amounts of money that are spent in Ohio and Michigan compared to other states that 
lack party labels on the ballot in general elections. He reports that “the top two most 
expensive nonpartisan states (Ohio and Michigan) are states that nominate their candi-
dates in partisan primaries or conventions, even though the general election is nonpar-
tisan” (Bonneau 2007c, 66). Likewise, according to data analyzed by the Brennan 
Center for Justice, more money was spent on television advertising in Ohio between 
2000 and 2009 than in any other state; Michigan ranks third (Sample et al. 2010).
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There is empirical evidence that the classification of these two states can drive 
empirical results and substantive conclusions. For example, in their empirical study of 
state court decision-making in death penalty cases, Blume and Eisenberg (1998, 489) 
report that
[The existence of] a statistically significant relationship between judicial selection methods 
and death penalty case outcomes depends, in part, on how strictly one adheres to conventional 
classification of judicial election methods. But the relation depends largely on how one state, 
Ohio, is classified and does not hold for the mass of states. (489)
As a result of evidence that classification of Michigan and Ohio can affect the sub-
stantive conclusions of research, scholars seeking to more fully advance understand-
ing of the role of judicial selection mechanisms will be well served by efforts to be 
transparent in their coding decisions, to clearly explain their criteria for classification, 
and to demonstrate that the results are robust given alternative coding criteria. Research 
demonstrates that the classification of the two states does not always affect the robust-
ness of results. Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark (2009), Canes-Wrone and Clark 
(2009), Frederick and Streb (2008), and Cann (2007) all acknowledge the unusual 
electoral procedures in these two states and provide discussions indicating that their 
reported empirical results are robust to their treatment of Michigan and Ohio. 
Nonetheless, more widespread efforts to test and report the results of alternative clas-
sification systems and robustness of research findings will provide more reliable and 
consistent conclusions to those scholars, policy-makers, and media outlets who seek 
answers about the practical implications of judicial election systems.
Importantly, we do not claim that these two states should be classified under all cir-
cumstances as partisan election states. Rather, given the varied roles that political parties 
play in these states—particularly before the general election—we argue that scholars 
should consider whether their theory is best operationalized with a classification system 
that places these states in the partisan election category or one in which these two states 
are treated as nonpartisan election states; scholars should explain to readers why either 
coding is (or is not) appropriate to the study at hand. A third option, following Dubois 
(1979) and Kritzer (2011), is to treat the two states as their own category.6
Replication and Results
To illustrate the effect that reclassification can have on empirical results and substan-
tive conclusions, we examined the results of a recent, important study of voter turnout 
in judicial elections. In a 2008 American Journal of Political Science article, Hall and 
Bonneau investigate the factors that affect the decisions of voters to participate in 
judicial elections once they have reached the polls. Our goal in this analysis is not to 
comment on or verify the modeling or coding decisions used by the authors; rather, we 
assess the extent to which the conclusions drawn from empirical analyses are sensitive 
to the classification of Ohio and Michigan. We chose Hall and Bonneau’s data because 
they explicitly and clearly delineate their coding choices and the theory that underlies 
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those decisions. Moreover, because Hall and Bonneau’s study encompasses both the 
pre-general election and general election stages of the electoral process (the emer-
gence of a challenger and ballot roll-off in the general election day), their data provide 
an ideal setting to explore the effects that Ohio and Michigan can have on empirical 
models. Finally, given Bonneau and Hall’s (2009; Hall and Bonneau 2006) other work 
on the effects of candidate qualifications on voters, we believe that a strong alternative 
theory that exists which suggests that, in this setting, voters likely bring additional 
information—including information on candidates’ party affiliations—with them into 
the ballot booth, making the coding of these two states as partisan election states also 
justifiable. Thus, Bonneau and Hall’s study provides an ideal setting to explore the 
effects that this coding decision may have on empirical results.
In their article, Hall and Bonneau assess the effects of a number of factors, such as 
total campaign spending, electoral institutions, and candidate experience on ballot 
roll-off. Hall and Bonneau are clear that their criterion for measuring the partisan char-
acter of the election is the text of the ballot. They write, “we include a variable that 
indicates whether or not the candidates’ political party affiliations are listed on the 
ballot” (Hall and Bonneau 2008, 462).
Hall and Bonneau estimate a pair of Heckman selection models, with a dichoto-
mous variable indicating whether or not a race was contested as the dependent variable 
in the first stage; the second stage of the model uses the percentage of ballot roll-off as 
the dependent variable. Hall and Bonneau (2008, 468) conclude, in part, that
In fact, our results have considerable import for understanding elections that are not the top 
draws on the ballot. Among other things, we have additional evidence from this analysis that 
nonpartisan elections discourage voting while expensive campaigning promotes it.
The first step in our analysis was to obtain data for the purposes of replication 
which we were able to obtain from Professor Bonneau’s webpage.7 With the exception 
of the test statistic for the Wald test of independent equations, we were able to repli-
cate all of Hall and Bonneau’s empirical results exactly.8 Having replicated Hall and 
Bonneau’s results, we reestimated Bonneau and Hall’s model using two different cod-
ing specifications. First, given extant research about the ability of voters to differenti-
ate among candidates using criteria that is not present on the ballot, one might theorize 
that voters may also bring information about the candidate’s partisan affiliation 
gleaned from the candidate selection (primary) segment of the electoral process. To 
this end, we reestimated the model coding both Ohio and Michigan as partisan election 
states to account for the partisan nature of the candidate selection process; this coding 
rule follows that used in The Book of the States and by the American Judicature 
Society. Finally, on the theory that the mixed partisan-nonpartisan nature of the candi-
date selection and general election segments of the electoral process in these two states 
make them different from the rest of the country, we reestimated a model (following 
Dubois 1979 and Kritzer 2007; 2011) treating the two states as a separate category. 
This specification is particularly useful because it allows us to determine how—both 
in the first and second stages of the model—Ohio and Michigan are statistically simi-
lar (and dissimilar) to states otherwise categorized as partisan and nonpartisan states.
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Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the models. The two models differ in one 
respect—the measurement of campaign spending. The model presented in Table 1 
uses the log of total spending (adjusted to 1990 dollars); the model in Table 2 uses per 
capita spending (adjusted to 1990 dollars).
Table 1. Results of Three Heckman Selection Models.
Replication
Ohio and 
Michigan as 
partisan
Ohio and 
Michigan as 
mixed
 Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Stage 1: The presence of a challenger
 Competitive seat 0.54* 0.20 0.59* 0.24 0.58* 0.23
 Elected incumbent −0.90* 0.36 −0.99* 0.39 −1.00* 0.38
 Appointed incumbent −0.35 0.38 −0.36 0.41 −0.40 0.41
 Salary 0.15 0.23 −0.16 0.25 −0.12 0.26
 Term 0.00 0.10 −0.10 0.07 −0.09 0.08
 Unified government −0.51 0.30 −0.61* 0.31 −0.66* 0.30
 Partisan 0.65 0.41 1.44* 0.51 1.30* 0.50
 District 1.10* 0.51 1.58* 0.56 1.55* 0.56
 Partisan × district −2.72* 0.65 −2.85* 0.72 −2.81* 0.71
 Lawyers 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00
 Post-White 0.11 0.29 0.04 0.33 0.01 0.33
 Intercept −0.45 1.23 1.79 1.31 1.58 1.28
 Mixed 1.88* 0.55
Stage 2: Ballot roll-off
 In(Total spending) −1.76* 0.55 −1.37* 0.59 −2.07* 0.65
 New SC candidate −0.63 1.06 −0.40 1.10 0.02 1.18
 Presidential election 4.79* 0.77 3.51* 0.91 4.48* 0.70
 Partisan −15.08* 2.55 −1.52 4.87 −11.59* 3.21
 District −13.04* 4.15 −0.62 6.82 −9.69* 4.13
 Partisan × District 15.07* 3.70 −4.21 8.64 10.63* 3.90
 Education −0.59 0.30 0.45 0.34 −0.44 0.30
 1994-1996 2.40 1.77 −1.67 2.34 1.93 1.59
 1998-2000 3.43 2.13 −3.40 2.98 2.56 1.99
 2002-2004 0.73 2.35 −6.28 3.40 0.01 2.12
 Intercept 90.38* 22.30 −1.11 29.13 79.58* 22.69
 Mixed 3.60 3.49
 Log likelihood −764.47 −776.46 −754.72  
 Wald test of independent equations 21.81* 3.15 4.96*  
Note. The dependent variable in the first stage is dichotomous and indicates whether or not the race was 
contested. The dependent variable in the second stage is the percent of ballot roll-off. There are 260 
total observations; 69 observations are censored. Standard errors are clustered by state.
*Statistical significance at the p < .05 level using a two-tailed test.
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The first column of both tables present model estimates for the case where both Ohio 
and Michigan are coded as nonpartisan elections. In the first stage of the model, competi-
tive seats are more likely to include multiple candidates, while races which feature elected 
incumbents are less likely to induce a challenger to enter the race. In the voter participa-
tion stage of the model, the results indicate that increased spending is associated with 
lower ballot roll-off. In addition, the model results suggest that a number of institutional 
Table 2. Results of Three Heckman Selection Models.
Replication
Ohio and 
Michigan as 
partisan
Ohio and 
Michigan as 
mixed
 Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Stage 1: The presence of a challenger
 Competitive seat 0.57* 0.21 0.59* 0.25 0.59* 0.24
 Elected incumbent −0.91* 0.38 −0.99* 0.40 −1.00* 0.39
 Appointed incumbent −0.36 0.40 −0.35 0.42 −0.37 0.42
 Salary 0.12 0.24 −0.18 0.26 −0.15 0.26
 Term 0.00 0.10 −0.10 0.07 −0.08 0.08
 Unified government −0.52 0.31 −0.61* 0.31 −0.65* 0.30
 Partisan 0.72 0.42 1.48* 0.49 1.37* 0.48
 District 1.06* 0.53 1.58* 0.57 1.54* 0.57
 Partisan × district −2.66* 0.68 −2.84* 0.73 −2.79* 0.73
 Lawyers 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00
 Post-White 0.12 0.30 0.03 0.33 0.01 0.33
 Intercept −0.24 1.29 1.87 1.31 1.68 1.30
 Mixed 1.98* 0.52
Stage 2: Ballot Roll-Off
 ln(Per Capita Spending) −1.73* 0.46 −1.29* 0.46 −1.81* 0.46
 New SC candidate −0.14 1.02 −0.16 1.08 0.32 1.13
 Presidential election 4.92* 0.78 3.64* 0.89 4.71* 0.74
 Partisan −15.77* 2.52 −2.79 4.92 −13.75* 2.96
 District −9.63* 4.54 1.16 6.95 −7.58 4.39
 Partisan × district 14.20* 4.21 −3.98 8.90 11.4* 4.08
 Education −0.58 0.30 0.42 0.34 −0.51 0.29
 1994–1996 2.15 1.69 −1.77 2.27 1.75 1.52
 1998–2000 3.35 2.14 −3.27 2.88 2.82 1.90
 2002–2004 0.77 2.18 −6.07 3.22 0.36 1.91
 Intercept 74.77* 23.38 −10.29 28.70 66.83* 22.24
 Mixed 1.56 3.04
 Log likelihood −761.20 −774.79 −752.29  
 Wald test of independent equations 9.44* 0.77 0.88  
Note. The dependent variable in the first stage is dichotomous and indicates whether or not the race was 
contested. The dependent variable in the second stage is the percent of ballot roll-off. There are 260 
total observations; 69 observations are censored. Standard errors are clustered by state.
*Statistical significance at the π < .05 level using a two-tailed test. 
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factors, such as the partisan character of the race and the nature of the district, affect ballot 
roll-off. These results lead Hall and Bonneau (2008, 466) to conclude that
Clearly, institutions can either encourage or discourage participation in these elections, an 
important finding for those seeking to improve voting in judicial elections. This can be done 
simply by modifying the rules under which the elections take place.
The second column presents model estimates coding both Ohio and Michigan as 
partisan election states. The results for the candidate selection stage of the model are 
nearly identical to those just discussed; the main difference is that in this model, unlike 
the first column of estimates, there is some evidence that challengers are less likely to 
enter the race during times of unified government. Again, in the voter participation 
stage of the model, higher spending is associated with lower ballot roll-off, and par-
ticipation is higher in presidential election years; however, there is again no evidence 
that the partisan character of the elections affects a voter’s decision to cast a vote.
The final column in the tables provides the results when, following Dubois (1979) 
and Kritzer (2011), the models treat Ohio and Michigan as a separate (mixed) cate-
gory. These results suggest findings in line with those reported by Bonneau and Hall. 
According to these models, challengers are more likely in partisan systems and ballot 
roll-off is lower in partisan contests. Yet, the coefficients for mixed systems (Ohio and 
Michigan) suggest that elections in these states operate differently than they do in 
partisan systems. While the estimated coefficient for these two states suggests that 
challengers are more likely to emerge in these two states than in the typical partisan or 
nonpartisan contest, the model provides no evidence that ballot roll-off in these two 
states differs significantly from roll-off in nonpartisan states. Indeed, though the coef-
ficient is not statistically significant, its estimated magnitude is in the opposite direc-
tion than the coefficient for partisan states. Thus, the model suggests that, even after 
controlling for differences in the intensity of the campaigns (as measured financially), 
these two states are more competitive than the average partisan state but that participa-
tion in these states mirrors that in nonpartisan elections.
In short, these three models reveal dramatic differences in their results. When Ohio 
and Michigan are treated as nonpartisan election states, ballot roll-off is lower in nonpar-
tisan elections. On the other hand, when the two states are treated as partisan, there is no 
evidence that any additional factors have a statistically reliable relationship with ballot 
roll-off aside from a robust effect indicating increased ballot roll-off in presidential elec-
tion years. Finally, when the two states are treated as their own, separate category, the 
results again change. Michigan and Ohio appear to be similar to partisan election states 
in the candidate selection stage of the electoral process while they perform similarly to 
nonpartisan election states during the general election. In short, the findings that one 
might draw from these analyses depend on the classification of these two states.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed the difficulties that the electoral rules used in Ohio and 
Michigan pose for scholars aiming to isolate the effects of institutional factors on 
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judicial and electoral behavior in the United States. Reference works and scholars 
alike have treated these two states in different ways, and we have presented evidence 
that, in some cases, these decisions have driven the substantive conclusions that schol-
ars have drawn from their empirical analyses.
Of course, theory must ultimately dictate the coding decisions that scholars use. 
While some scholars may argue that these two states should always be treated as non-
partisan election states simply because party labels are absent from the ballot, we 
disagree. Given the important role that political parties play in these two states—in 
both the candidate selection and general election stages of the electoral game—schol-
ars would do well to recognize that, at least in some circumstances, these states are 
better coded as partisan election states.
While our discussion focuses on studies of electoral behavior, the classification of 
state electoral systems also affects other types of state judicial politics research. In a 
study of judicial decision-making, for example, scholars need to be clear about how 
they believe political parties affect judicial behavior. If one believes that judges behave 
in a certain way simply because of the letter (or word) that will appear next to their 
name on the ballot (and, by extension, the cues it sends to voters), then it would be 
appropriate to treat Ohio and Michigan as nonpartisan election states. On the other 
hand, if one believes that judges are influenced by the myriad actions that parties can 
take to influence the election before voters arrive at the polls (by recruiting, funding, 
and supporting a primary challenger, changing the amount of campaign support they 
provide to a candidate in the next general election), then theory suggests that these two 
states should be treated as partisan election states.
Moreover, in addition to Ohio and Michigan, four states use nontraditional selec-
tion and/or retention methods for their state supreme court judges. Illinois and 
Pennsylvania rely upon partisan elections for initial selection and uncontestable reten-
tion elections for retention. Montana uses contestable nonpartisan elections; however, 
if a justice is unopposed, the ballot follows the “Yes or No” format common in reten-
tion elections rather than giving voters a single option in uncontested contests. New 
Mexico uses an even more complex system: gubernatorial appointment, followed by a 
contestable partisan election, followed by subsequent uncontestable retention elec-
tions (American Judicature Society 2013). Our discussion and analysis in this note 
focused on Ohio and Michigan since the electoral rules they use are unique. While 
these other four states use a mix of ballot types, the classification of each election is 
clear, and the relationship between the processes used in the general and primary elec-
tions are similar to those followed by other states. Still, our advice holds for these 
elections, as well: where necessary, scholars should be transparent about the possibil-
ity that reasonable reclassification based on theoretical assessment of the practical 
implications of electoral rules may change empirical results and, more importantly, the 
substantive conclusions derived from them.
As a result, we recommend that research examining these systems should (a) clearly 
delineate the theory behind one’s coding decisions and (b) test and report the results 
using alternative coding where alternative codings are theoretically justified. 
Regardless of how scholars choose to treat these two states in their empirical analyses, 
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we urge scholars to reference additional analyses, where such reclassifications are 
theoretically justifiable, and make the results of alternative classification decisions 
transparent to their readers.
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Notes
1. Elections for most Arizona trial courts also follow this procedure (American Judicature 
Society 2013; Nelson 2011).
2. Elections to fill seats on Ohio trial and appellate courts use the same partisan primary/no 
party labels in the general election system. The unique procedure in Michigan is only used 
to fill seats on the Michigan Supreme Court; trial and intermediate court seats are filled 
using traditional nonpartisan elections at both stages of the electoral process (American 
Judicature Society 2013).
3. The Book of the States classifies Ohio’s elections as nonpartisan from 1990-1998 and par-
tisan from 2003 to the present (in 2000 and 2002, instead of providing summary classifica-
tions, The Book of the States indicates that Ohio uses a partisan nomination process with 
no party labels on the general election ballot). Elections in Michigan are classified as non-
partisan from 1990-1994 and 2007 to the present and as partisan elections from 2003-2006. 
In 1996, 1998, and 2000, The Book of the States does not provide a summary classification 
and again indicates that Michigan uses partisan nominating procedures followed by no 
party labels on the general election ballot. State Court Organization classifies both states 
as nonpartisan in 1998; in 2004, Michigan is classified as a nonpartisan election state and 
Ohio is classified as a partisan election state.
4. It is important to note that this point represents a scope condition on our argument. We 
do not claim that all elections in which party labels do not appear on the general election 
ballot can (or should) be classified as partisan election states if the political party played a 
role in the campaign. Rather, because political parties in these two states play a unique and 
formalized role in the candidate selection process, classifications based entirely on the text 
of the general election ballot prioritize that voting cue over the formal role that the political 
party plays in the candidate selection process.
5. Given that party affiliation is one of a number of factors, such as a candidate’s qualifica-
tions or incumbency status that may affect a voter’s decision-making, the rate of partisan 
defection may capture factors other than a voter’s ability to identify the judicial candidate 
from their political party. While Baum’s research indicates that party affiliation plays a 
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role in judicial decision-making even though party is absent from the ballot, it should be 
noted that Baum (1987b) shows that rates of partisan defections were higher in the State 
Supreme Court races than in the corresponding presidential contest. However, in the same 
study, Baum shows that defection is often common among the most informed voters; in 
other words, defection is particularly common among voters who we would expect already 
know the candidate’s party affiliation.
6. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
7. Bonneau and Hall’s data contain a series of state codes beginning at 101. To deter-
mine which state codes correspond with each state, we matched the values for Hall and 
Bonneau’s variable for the education rate in each state with data collected from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.
8. For the model presented in Table 1, Hall and Bonneau estimate a test statistic of 26.64, 
with a p value of .000. For the model presented in Table 2, Hall and Bonneau’s estimated 
test statistic is 10.62 with a p value of .001.
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